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RECENT CASE NOTES
Quasi contract rests upon the equitable principle that one may not enrich
himself at another's expense; it rests, not upon the contract, but upon
the obligation created by law in the absence of any agreement thereon.
Miller v. Schlass, 218 N. Y. 400; Grossbier v. Chi., St. P., M. & 0. Ry. Co.,
173 Wis. 503. But if the illegal contract is fully performed on both sides,
there is no basis for quasi contractual obligations. Stansfield v. Kunz,
62 Kan. 797.
To establish the existence of any quasi contractual obligation, it must
be shown, (1) that the defendant has received a benefit from the plaintiff;
and (2) that the retention of the benefit by the defendant is inequitable.
Woodward, op cit., Sec. 7. H. W. J.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POLICE POWER-REIOVAL OF GARBAGE-STATU-
TORY CONSTRUCTION-Appellant, Jansen Farms, Inc., collected from the
Claypool Hotel Restaurant, the Thompson's Restaurant, and the Union
Depot Restaurant, all the material left from the tables, and preparation
of the food for the tables, by virtue of purchase from the owners. The
material was deposited in special containers, which were kept free from
flies and insects and emitted no noxious odors. These containers were
collected daily, at a time when their collection by truck did not interfere
with traffic. They were hauled to appellant's farm, two miles from the city,
where appellant had erected a modern sanitary hog feeding plant, which
is free from unpleasant odors, and there the contents were fed to appel-
lant's hogs. In addition to this service, appellant recovered and restored
to the owners the silverware inadvertently placed in the containers with
the refuse material. Appellant's hogs were sold to an anti-hog cholera
serum manufacturing plant. It was claimed that appellant's hogs produced
a superior serum due to the mineral elements and vitamines in this mate-
rial fed to his hogs.
Appellee, the City of Indianapolis (Sanitary District) maintains a
garbage collection service, and a reduction plant, and produces and sells
garbage grease and tankage. Appellee threatened to arrest appellant for
collecting garbage, and to collect such material itself without payment to
the restaurant owners. Appellee had not prior thereto collected it and the
owners refused to permit it to do so.
Appellee brought an action to restrain appellant from collecting, haul-
ing away, or disposing of any garbage found within the sanitary district
of Indianapolis, which acts were alleged to be in violation of Sec. 10608
Burns' Annotated Statutes, 1926. Appellant filed a cross-complaint seeking
an injunction to prevent appellee from interfering with its collection of
food products, left from the tables, purchased from certain restaurants.
Judgment was given for appellee on both the complaint and the cross-
complaint. Appellant moved for a new trial alleging that judgment was
not sustained by the evidence, and contrary to law. The motion was over-
ruled. Appeal.
Held, judgment reversed with directions to grant a new trial. Jansen
Farms, Inc. v. City of Indianaplis (Sanitary District), Sup. Ct., Ind.,
April 22, 1930, 171 N. E. 199.
The court in so deciding held the statute constitutional, on the grounds
that though there was a property right in garbage as defined by the statute,
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the statute was an exercise of the police power, and that therefore, though
it provided for the collection of garbage without remuneration, it was not
an appropriation of property without due process of law. It is justified as
an exercise of police power on the grounds that there is a reasonable
necessity; that is, there is a social interest in prompt disposal of garbage
for the protection of health; and that in order to protect that interest it is
expedient to have a system of collection and disposal. The authorities sup-
port this as a proper exercise of police power. See Walker V. State, 140
Ind. 591; Spencer v. City of Medford, 276 Pac. 1114 (Oregon); City of
Grand Rapids v. Devries, 123 Mich. 570, 82 N. W. 269; State ex rel. Mooch
v. City of Cincinnati, 120 Ohio St. 500, 166 N. E. 583.
The basis for the reversal of the judgment was that the material in
question was not garbage within the statutory definition. Burn's Rev. St.,
1926, sec. 10608. The court declared that construing that statute strictly,
this material was not garbage, and that it would not extend the statutory
definition of "refuse from the kitchen."
It decided that the removal in a sanitary manner of certain food ma-
terial which were not waste or refuse, in other words, not kitchen refuse,
from cooking food according to the statutory definition of garbage, was
not sufficient evidence to support the judgment. It bases this on the fact
that improved sanitary methods, and increase in value of such materials
have made them become a valuable product instead of waste, and that not
being waste or refuse matter, they do not come within the statutory
definition.
The case of Bishop v. Tulsa, 21 Okla. Crim. Rep. 457, 209 Pac. 228, was
cited on that proposition. In that case, like materials were termed by.
products, and held not to be garbage. In that case, however, the restaurant
owner, by drying out and mixing with meal bran and oats, made a hog-
food which was placed in cans for sale. The court announced that by-
products cared for in such a manner as not to interfere with public or
private rights amounted to a private property right of the owner that
could not be abrogated or destroyed by police regulations.
In the ordinary use of the word "garbage," or kitchen refuse from
cooking food as it is defined by statute in Indiana, the materials involved
in this case would be included. In 27 Corpus Juris 1107, garbage is defined
as any worthless offensive matter, offal, refuse animal and vegetable
matter from a kitchen. In Dupoint v. Dist. of Col., 20 App. (D. C.) 477,
it is regarded as refuse of animal and vegetabbk food stuffs. In Valley
Springs Hog Ranch v. Plagmann, 282 Mo. 1, 220 S. W. 1, it is considered
to be refuse matter from household or hotel kitchens. These are essentially
the same as our statutory definition, yet in those cases material of the
same character as that in the principal case was determined to be garbage.
In People v. Gardmer, 199 U. S. 325, the court said that it would take
judicial knowledge of the fact that table refuse, when dumped into recep-
tacles for that purpose, may speedily ferment and emit noisome odors,
calculated to affect the public health. The inconvenience or loss suffered
by the owner is presumed to be compensated in the common benefit,
secured by the regulation. In the case of the City of Rochester v.- Gulberlett,
33 N. Y. Supp. 541, where the same materials were involved, and also the
point of construction of a statutory definition, an opposite result to that
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of the principal case was reached, and the material determined to be gar-
bage. The court there said, "While an ordinance, such as this under con-
sideration is to be strictly construed, it is nevertheless to be construed
according to the fair and usual meaning of its language in the light of
the purpose of its enactment. If such material as is here shown to be
collected is not garbage, bones, and kitchen refuse (st. provision), it is
difficult to understand what it is. Unquestionably, the word 'garbage'
involves rejection for all purposes. It has been rejected as food. It is
more or less mingled, so that it is objectionable to human sensibilities, as
well as unfit for human consumption. The court is not unmindful of the
fact that refuse of the kind is usually noisome and disgusting, both in
appearance and odor, and that the word 'garbage' carries to the ordinary
mind the idea of filth; but if refuse of this character is not held to be
garbage until fermentation sets in, then the very object of the ordinance
would be defeated, and a reasonable and proper precaution in the interests
of the inhabitants of the city brought to naught. Who could say when
fermentation to an objectionable extent took place."
If, in the principal case, the statutory definition of garbage had been
construed according to the fair and usual meaning of its language in the
light of the purpose of its enactment, it is a logical conclusion that the
material in question here would be encompassed as garbage. There was a
rejection for human consumption, materials subject to rapid fermentation,
a potential danger to social interests and welfare, in fact, all of the dan-
gers of the situation that prompt the enactment of such statutes are
present.
The mere fact that it works an individual hardship or that in a par-
ticular case, no nuisance or danger exists due to sanitary methods should
not outweigh the considerations which motivated the passage of the statute,
namely, that there is a social interest in the preservation of public health;
that all people who gather such materials as constitute garbage are not
sanitary in their methods, thereby endangering the health of the inhabi-
tants of the city, and that it is easier to observe sanitation through one
agency than by supervision and restriction of many individual agents or
property owners. The material in question in this decision is free from
the restriction placed on garbage, and remains a source of dissemination
of disease. The effect, therefore, is not that of refusal to extend the statu-
tory definition of garbage, but rather to place a limitation on it.
The court announced a rule of law in regard to regulation of garbage
disposal that is sound both on principle and authority; but after doing so,
in the light of the authorities cited, it seems that it placed too narrow
an interpretation on the statutory definition of garbage, thereby in effect
nullifying the very rule it announced. The rejected food materials from
restaurant kitchens present a greater danger from nuisance and injury
to the public health, due to the quantity of the material and the large
number of people who pass in the vicinity of the restaurants, than does
the waste material to which the court limited the term garbage. H. N. F.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-CONSTITUTIONAL DEBT LIMIT-The action
was brought to enjoin the school town, its trustees, and Oakland City
School Realty Co. from performing a lease contract. The appellants con-
